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GAPING HOLE: DARNING INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
DISASTERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
VERONICA THREADGILL*
I. Introduction
Transnational corporations (TNCs) are unique creatures, wielding
significant financial and political influence, with the ability to able to
escape the consequences that keep nations and other international
organizations in line with the laws governing the protection of human rights
and the environment. Many TNCs have exploited this blind spot in
international law to achieve profit-seeking goals. Before the emergence of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the late 20th century, corporations
served one master – the shareholder – and their single duty was to
maximize earnings.1 As corporations came under fire following various
scandals that generated media publicity, the idea that corporations owe
more than a simple fiduciary duty to the society in which they operate
began to garner support.2
Encouraging corporations to adopt a more socially-conscious mindset,
however, is simply that – encouragement. There are no mechanisms in
place that require corporations to behave in responsible ways, beyond
adherence to domestic law. National oversight is inconsistent, and thus the
* The author is a second-year law student at the University of Oklahoma. I would like
to thank my family for their unending support. I am forever grateful for their love and
encouragement.
1. RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, Business Ethics, 10 (7th ed. 2011) (ebook).
2. See infra Part III, notes (for a discussion on the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico
and Royal Dutch Shell’s activities in Nigeria).
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range of tolerated behaviors varies significantly. Human rights violations
tend to go hand-in-hand with companies operating in the oil, gas, and
natural resource industries. The discovery of valuable natural resources, be
it oil or cobalt, generally promises an economic windfall for a community;
however, such unearthing can lead to destabilization, financial turmoil,
violence, and repression. A hopeful harbinger turns into a cruel catalyst for
oppression. The discovery of mineral and energy resources has spawned
civil wars and violent, economically turbulent eras.3 In ongoing conflict
areas, matters are exacerbated. Transnational corporations are frequently
involved in human rights violations via two avenues. TNCs may violate
rights either directly through the exploitation of labor or the creation of
environmental hazards. Such corporations may also be involved in
violations indirectly through financial infusions that are redirected to
support violent, oppressive regimes or to hire security that commits heinous
acts against local populations. Countries, particularly those that are reliant
on the infusions of capital brought about from the presence of TNCs, are
not keen on giving their golden gooses the boot. Accountability, however,
must come from somewhere.
By highlighting the interplay of environmental rights and human rights
law, there is potential for international organizations to use economic
measures and criminal liability to police the actions of TNCs, particularly
those which specialize in oil, gas, and natural resources. While the concept
of encapsulating environmental rights into human rights law is not new, it is
still relatively novel. Through further incorporation of environmental rights
into the body of human rights law, more avenues for holding TNCs
accountable become viable. By anticipating the growing trend in the
international community, TNCs in the oil, gas, and natural resource
industries can begin preparations for more stringent environmental and
human rights compliance. Such a shift in international law will have
sweeping impacts and a particularly poignant effect on TNCs in the
extractive industries.
When the Exxon Valdez oil spill occurred in Alaska, it made sense for
the United States to press criminal charges against Exxon Mobil.4 Exxon is

3. Roy Maconachie et. al., World Bank Group [WBG], Responding to the Challenge of
Fragility and Security in West Africa: Natural Resources, Extractive Industry, Investment,
and Social Conflict, at 5 nn.1-2, 98902 (2015), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
169321468189569256/pdf/98902-WP-AFR-P148420-Box-393185B-PUBLIC-ExtractivesFINAL.pdf
4. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476 (2008).
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an American company, and the oil spill happened in U.S. waters.5
Prosecution, therefore, was jurisdictionally straightforward. The resulting
financial payments to the United States were redirected to clean up efforts.
The victims of the oil spill whose livelihoods were negatively impacted by
the spill only received compensation nearly 20 years after the incident, and
the Supreme Court awarded damages significantly smaller than initially
expected.6 Had this entity been a foreign oil company or had the oil spill
occurred elsewhere in the world, it is unclear who would have been able to
hold Exxon accountable. The legal framework needs a serious overhaul to
address such blatant gaps in liability.
The difficulty with attempting to regulate TNCs is the absence of any
regulatory scheme which gives the appropriate authority for governing
agencies to bring charges against corporations and responsible individuals
for their crimes. Even when indirectly attacking a TNC, determining the
applicable international law to apply is difficult. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) has the potential to act as a regulatory body by
imposing sanctions on countries. This direction would require the
organization to transcend its original purpose of promoting trade while
having no direct effect on corporations, and is therefore a potential, but not
best suited, avenue. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) also have potential to hold states
accountable for human rights violations that occur within their territories
and under their jurisdiction, but, again, this method circumvents TNC
liability. Therefore, the most promising route is reworking the International
Criminal Court and the Rome Statute, which currently addresses individual
liability for grievous crimes, to encompass environmental disasters and
human rights violations.
II. Environmental law principles
It is important to first understand the core principles of environmental
law, both those that are currently customary – and therefore binding – and
those that are on track to becoming customary law.

5. Id.
6. Kim Murphy, Exxon Valdez victims finally getting payout, THE SEATTLE TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2008, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/exxon-valdez-victims-finallygetting-payout/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
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A. “No Harm” Principle
The invigorated environmental movements of the mid-20th century
brought revitalized initiatives from international bodies, building on past
environmental principles. The cornerstone principle of “No Harm” was
concretely championed in the Trail Smelter Arbitration, a dispute between
the United States and Canada.7 The Canadian corporation Trail Smelter was
emitting sulfur dioxide, which caused damage in the form of air pollution in
the state of Washington.8 Relying on case law from water pollution rights in
the United States, as well as a theory on cantonal autonomy from Swiss
law, The Arbitral Tribunal monumentally determined:
[N]o State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in
such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case is
of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
convincing evidence.9
This decision created the foothold for other important environmental law
developments to cling. The Arbitral Tribunal solidified a state’s duty to
refrain from activities that will negatively impact their neighbors, but also
emphasized that States have an additional duty to ensure that private actors
within their territory do not cause transboundary harm. This principle of
state responsibility for private actors is a key point in linking the
responsibility for TNCs to their countries of incorporation. The “No Harm”
principle also appears in Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), a
comprehensive document linking environmental rights to human rights.10
The Stockholm Declaration is not legally binding on the international
community but is rather an iteration of internationally agreed-upon
environmental principles. The Declaration serves in the effort to solidify the
slightly-idealistic aspirations of environmental law, paving the way for
binding law. The Earth Summit of 1992 birthed the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development (Rio Declaration), which regurgitated many
of the principles of the Stockholm Declaration, including the rule of “No

7. Arbitral Trib., 3 U.N. Rep. Int’l Arb. Awards – Trail Smelter Case 1905 (1941).
8. Id. at 1917.
9. Id. at 1965.
10. U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.I, (1973) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
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Harm.”11 At that same summit, parties ratified the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which also
includes the idea that while States have the “sovereign right to exploit their
own resources,” they also have “the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment
of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”12
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) weighed in on the issue with its
1996 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons. This document referenced the Rio Declaration to remind States
of their obligation to consider the transboundary environmental effects that
nuclear weapons are capable of causing.13 The ICJ argued that the use of
nuclear weapons would violate the instruments relating to the protection of
the environment.14 Today, the “No Harm” principle is part of the body of
binding customary international law, due to its pervasive nature and
widespread acceptance. This tenet of environmental law is essential in
directing responsibility for environmental wrongs to the liable State. At the
very least, the onus rests on that State, but ideally, within this paper’s
proposed framework, the State would be able to shift responsibility for the
causation of trans-boundary harm to a more-accountable TNC.
B. Procedural Rights
There are important environmental procedural rights that carry weight as
well. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE)
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus
Convention) binds parties to its provisional matters concerning procedural
rights.15 Highlighting the document’s importance, the UNECE describes the
document as the “only legally binding global instruments on environmental

11. .U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1) annex I, (Aug. 12,
1992).
12. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1, S. Treaty Doc No.
102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (May 9, 1992).
13. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
95, 4 (July 8).
14. Id.
15. U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,
June 15, 1998, 2161 UNTS 447; 38 ILM 517 (1999) [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
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democracy.”16 These environmental rights, as indicated in the Convention’s
title, require national authorities to make information available to the public
regarding a wide variety of environmental issues.17 The Convention also
mandates the manner in which States must create means of redress
regarding environmental concerns through a judicial system18 and provides
the public with the right to participate in decision-making regarding certain
activities.19 These rights mirror those found in the International Bill of
Rights, namely those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)20 and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(UDHR),21 both overwhelmingly critical documents in the realm of human
rights.
TNCs, in conjunction with local governments, often pose threats to both
the principle of “No Harm” and certain guaranteed procedural rights
through their operations. Extractive operations are certain to affect the
environment and health of neighboring States, and close relationships with
governments are prone to result in either blocked access to the judicial
system or diminished chances that grievances will result in favorable
outcomes to persons affected by TNC activities. Particularly when TNCs
operate in areas with repressive governments, the incentive to protect the
oft-lucrative extractive industry incentivizes governments to neglect the
local population’s democratic rights in general, nevertheless those
regarding environmental justice.
II. Relationship between human rights and environment
Several major international bodies have articulated the connection
between human rights and environmental law. The Aarhus Convention’s
valuable relationship to human rights stems from part of the statement of
purpose, proclaiming that “adequate protection of the environment is
essential to…the enjoyment of basic human rights, including the right to
life itself.”22 Quick to follow, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the

16. Public Participation, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE,
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2018).
17. Aarhus Convention, supra note 15, art. 4.
18. Id. art. 9.
19. Id. art. 6.
20. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 999 U.N.T.S.
171; S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
21. .G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). .
22. Aarhus Convention, supra note 15.
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European Union explicitly provides for environmental protection in Article
37:
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement
of the quality of the environment must be integrated into the
policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with the
principle of sustainable development.23
UN Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 of March 200924 and
Resolution 16/11 of April 2011 both highlight how the effects of climate
change can have negative effects on the enjoyment of human rights.25 Both
Resolutions essentially requested that the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights undertake a “detailed analytical study on
the relationship between climate change and human rights,” recognizing
that the two areas of law are dependent upon the other.26 Specifically,
Resolution 16/11 noted that “sustainable development and the protection of
the environment can contribute to human well-being and the enjoyment of
human rights” and that “environmental damage can have negative
implications…for the effective enjoyment of human rights.”27
The United Nations (UN) broke the interrelationship between
environmental rights and human rights into three approaches. First is
considering the environment as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of human
rights.28 That is to say, the State must maintain a certain level of
environmental protection to secure the full exercise of human rights.
Conversely, a deteriorating environment can hamper a person’s ability to
fully express their rights. Second is the notion that human rights are a
prerequisite for a healthy environment; certain human rights must be
enjoyed in order for “good environmental decision-making.”29 The rights
championed in the Aarhus Convention, for example, qualify as those that
involve the public in critical decision-making processes and provide access
to judicial redress for grievances. Without such procedures, the public’s
23. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 47, 2012 O.J. 326.
24. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/18/22 (Oct. 17,
2011)
25. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 16/11, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/L.7 (orally
revised) (March 24, 2011).
26. Id.; See also, U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Human Rights and the Environment, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
http://web.unep.org/divisions/delc/human-rights-and-environment (last visited Dec. 14,
2018).
29. Id.
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ability to speak and perform their civic duty is crippled. The third and final
concept is the idea that the right to “a safe, healthy and ecologicallybalanced environment [i]s a human right itself,” which the UN notes is a
debated approach.30 This eco-centric approach would list a healthy
environment alongside freedom from torture, instead of visualizing the
environment as a gateway to human rights expression. The first theory, that
a healthy environment is essential to the expression of the full spectrum of
human rights, is the most well-founded and is relevant to this paper.
Therefore, the other two concepts will not be discussed further.
The use of the right of respect for private and family life to combat
environmental wrongs is the best way to exhibit the first model of the
dependence of human rights upon the well-being of the environment.
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) articulates
that everyone has the right to protection of the law against “arbitrary
interference with his privacy, [and] family.”31 The European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) also contains a provision allocating this right.32
Article 8 of the ECHR details the “right to respect for private and family
life,” a key source in the crusade for transforming environmental harms into
human rights violations for parties to the Convention.33
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has applied Article 8 to
situations when functions of the state have committed environmental harms.
The Court has also used this provision to impose liability when a state has
reason to know of environmental harms occurring within its territory or
jurisdiction and took no action to combat such detriment. The European
Court of Human Rights has affirmed that “Article 8 may apply in
environmental cases whether the pollution is directly caused by the State or
whether State responsibility arises from the failure to regulate private
industry properly.”34 This principle of State responsibility is critical in
attempting to create mechanisms for international enforcement of TNCs
and justifying State responsibility for private actors’ violations of
fundamental rights. States have a limited responsibility for the actions of
30. Id.
31. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
32. European Convention on Human Rights, 1953, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1953)
(hereinafter ECHR).
33. Id.
34. Hatton and Others v. United Kingdom, 2003-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 228, para. 98. This
principle is reiterated more specifically in para. 119: “[T]he State’s responsibility in
environmental cases may also arise from a failure to regulate private industry in a manner
securing proper respect for the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention.”
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private industries as they relate to other nations. Case law regarding the
application of Article 8 is illuminating.
A. Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994)
Several local tanneries in Lorca, Spain opened a water treatment plant to
combat the pollution problem resulting from the tanneries’ operations.35
However, the water treatment plant itself engaged in activities which
resulted in the emission of foul odors and fumes – namely hydrogen sulfide
emissions which exceeding a permissible limit – that leeched into the
town.36 During that time, due to a malfunction at the plant, the town council
had to evacuate the residents, resulting in a 3-month relocation of Mrs.
López Ostra and her family.37 For three years, the López Ostra family dealt
with the noxious environment produced by the water treatment plant before
ultimately moving as a result of the fumes, smells, and noises having a
persistent and detrimental impact on their health.38 The European Court
determined that, while the state has a certain amount of leeway in balancing
the competing interest of the state’s economic objectives against an
individual’s effective enjoyment of their rights, here Spain failed to achieve
that balance.39 The Court found there had been a violation of Mrs. López
Ostra’s rights under Article 8 of the ECHR as a result of the water treatment
plant’s activities, emphasizing that “severe environmental pollution may
affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes
in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely,” even
without serious health endangerment.40 The Court ordered Spain to pay
35. López Ostra v. Spain A-303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. 46 (1994).
36. Id. at para. 7.
37. Id. at para. 8.
38. Id. at para. 7-8.
39. Id. at para. 58; see also, Hatton, supra note 34, which also suggests that a critical
element for a successful Article 8 claim is unlawfulness of the complained of activities at the
domestic level. It is critical that the State was also not in compliance with an aspect of a
domestic regime. That is to say, “the violation [is] predicated on a failure by the national
authorities to comply with some aspect of the domestic regime.” In Hatton, applicants
complained of nighttime noise disturbances as a result of night flights into the Heathrow
airport. However domestic authorities determined that the policy regulating nighttime flights
was in compliance with domestic law. Hatton partially predicated its decision to refuse to
find a violation of Article 8 on this compliance. This is contrasted in López Ostra, wherein
the waste water plant was operating without a proper license, and Guerra and Others, in
which the State failed to provide applicants with information that the State had a statutory
obligation to provide.
40. López Ostra v. Spain A-303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. 46, at para. 51 (1994).
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Mrs. López Ostra four million pesetas in damages, approximately $48,000
in today’s USD.41
B. Guerra and Others v. Italy (1998)
A chemical factory, one kilometer away from the applicants’ town of
Manfredonia, produced fertilizers and caprolactam, a chemical compound
“used in the manufacture of synthetic fibres such as nylon.”42 The Italian
Government classified the factory as “high risk,” based on the potential
hazards of certain activities deemed dangerous to the environment and local
populations.43 Indeed, the factory did emit large quantities of inflammable
gas, including arsenic trioxide. Due to a malfunction-caused explosion, onehundred and fifty people were hospitalized due to acute arsenic poisoning.44
The Court held that Italy failed in its duty to reasonably protect its citizens
from risk of harm from private actors.45
C. Tatar v. Romania (2009)
Around 100,000 cubic meters of cyanide-contaminated tailings water
spilled into the environment following a dam breach at a gold mine, which
used sodium cyanide in its gold extraction process.46 The Court found that
the Romanian authorities “failed in their duty to assess . . . the risks” and
neglected to enact “suitable measures in order to protect the rights of those
concerned to respect for their private lives and homes . . . and more
generally their right to enjoy a healthy and protected environment.”47 This
case also acknowledges the public’s right to access information and
participate in the decision-making process “prior to issuance of the
operating authorization,” essentially ensuring the public has a say in nearby
operations that could have negative consequences on the environment and
thus their health.48 The case also touches upon the importance of the
relevant principles of the Rio Declaration as well as the Aarhus Convention.
These cases in essence illustrate the deep relationship the environment
has to facilitating full expression of human rights. This close linkage is
41. Id. at 4.
42. Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 89.
43. Id. at para. 13.
44. Id. at para. 15.
45. Id. at Summary.
46. Press release issued by the Registrar: Chamber Judgment Tatar v. Romania, Eur. Ct.
H.R (Jan. 27, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng-press?i=003-2615810-2848789 (last
accessed Dec. 14, 2018).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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critical to underscore how drastically environmental harms can impact
human rights and thus the importance of incorporating such environmental
harms into the body of international criminal law. In the efforts to preserve
human rights, there must be an international avenue of redress against
TNCs that negatively impact the environment.
III. History of TNC accountability for human rights violations
and current frameworks
Until this point, the discussion has focused on cases when Courts have
deemed States accountable for actors within its territory, so it is necessary
to examine how the countries of the European Union, BRICS, and North
America have historically handled TNC accountability in order to fully
grasp the scope of the current climate. First, it is important to understand
corporate responsibility on an international scale. Corporations are not
powerless actors.49 They are capable entities whose business decisions
“directly affect the security or insecurity of local populations.”50 When
these decisions lead to human rights abuses, such as torture, arbitrary arrest,
physical injuries, and death, then the corporation should not be able to
escape accountability, though they often do. The current complaint
mechanisms available to victims of human rights violations do not offer an
avenue of redress against corporate actors. Human rights obligations only
bind nations.51 Additionally, when corporations are only indirectly involved
in violations, it may be inappropriate to “excessively expand[] corporate
involvement into human rights issues which remain primarily matters of
state concern.”52 The corporate social responsibility movement is on the
rise, and voluntary codes of conduct and self-regulation help manage an
image of accountability.53 Often, despite the “intentions of corporate
leaders, [corporate codes of conduct] bear only the remotest connection
with realities that are often brutal and inhumane.”54

49. Scott Pegg, An Emerging Market for the New Millennium: Transnational
Corporations and Human Rights, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1,
14 (Jedrezej George Frynas et al. eds.2003) (internal citations omitted).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted)
52. Id. at 15 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Charles Woolfson & Matthias Beck, Corporate social responsibility failures in the
oil industry, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS 114, 121 (Rory
Sullivan ed., 20013) (E-book).
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However, while meaningful legal liability under national and
international law is still, at the moment, woefully lacking, “there is no
logical reason that corporations cannot bear human rights-related
obligations.”55 Indeed, this trend is on the uptake. There have been several
instances that have drawn international attention, with varying levels of
corporate legal liability attached in response.
A. Royal Dutch Shell Nigeria
The activities of Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria are some of the most
well-known in the context of oil companies and human rights violations and
serves as a classic example.56 Royal Dutch Shell, Nigeria’s largest onshore
oil company at the time, worked closely with the government to ensure
operations would run smoothly and successfully.57 Revenue from oil began
filtering into the government, bypassing the natives of the production areas,
who suffered the brunt of the company’s damage to the environment and
their well-being.58 As a result, antagonism against oil industry rose
throughout the 1970s and 1980s as oil production also rose and the negative
environmental effects of Shell’s presence began to show.59 Most notably,
oil spills contaminated the water, damaging the livelihoods of farmers and
ordinary locals.
As it became abundantly clear to the locals that the Nigerian government
would do nothing to impede the environmental degradation resulting from
oil spills and seismic disturbances, they shifted their focus to plead to Shell
for relief. Villagers requested compensation for their losses as a result of
pollution and became understandably disgruntled when these pleas went
ignored.60
In an effort to shield the interests of the oil industry, the Nigerian
government began targeting growing protests by restricting various political
and economic rights – such as peaceful assembly – as well as infringing on
some of the most fundamental human rights, such as freedom from arbitrary
arrest and detention.61 The Nigerian government indiscriminately arrested
55. Pegg, supra note 49, at 16.
56. Jedrzej George Frynas, The Oil Industry in Nigeria: Conflict between Oil
Companies and Local People, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 99,
99 (Jedrezej George Frynas et. al ed., 2003).
57. Id. at 101-103.
58. Id. at 102.
59. Id. at 101.
60. Id. at 102.
61. Id. at 104.
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critics of the oil industry and seized the property of locals in the name of
furthering oil production.62 In this way, the presence of a TNC in Nigeria
indirectly contributed to the human rights abuses of the locals.63 More
severely, there is documentation to suggest that Shell employed the
protection of a Nigerian security force well-known for its brutality to
protect its assets against protesters; this security force then massacred a
small village on flimsy evidence of an impending attack on Shell’s oil
facilities.64 While the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
found Nigeria to be in violation of several provisions of the African Charter
of Human and People’s Rights, Shell escaped relatively unscathed.65
Scattered lawsuits in the United States (see below) and the Netherlands
resulted in settlements to compensate the Ogoni community for the
environmental and human rights violations sustained.66 This legal response
likely only occurred because this situation drew extreme attention from the
international community.
B. Piper Alpha Disaster
The 1988 Piper Alpha disaster, an explosion of an oil production
platform in the North Sea which killed 167 people, resulted due to a laundry
list of safety failures on the part of the platform’s owner, American
company Occidental.67 These safety failures directly implicated the
company’s management in the disaster.68 Gross disregards for safety over
time also indicated that the regulatory body charged with maintaining
oversight of the offshore industry also shouldered some of the blame. 69
Without the so-called ‘regulatory capture’ of the regulating agency
responsible for monitoring the offshore industry, Occidental’s management
failures would not have been possible.70 This regulatory capture happened
when the oversight body came to associate “‘the public good’ with the
interest of the industry.”71 This conflict of interest partially arose when the
Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the UK’s primary safety agency, was
62. Id. at 109.
63. Id. at 102.
64. Id. at 112 (internal citations omitted).
65. RE: Communication 155/96, African Commission on Human and People’s Rights,
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 (May 27, 2002).
66. Id.
67. Woolfson, supra note 54.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 117.
70. Id. at 117.
71. Id. at 118.
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not given responsibility for monitoring offshore safety.72 The Scottish High
Court also implicated anti-union practices as part of the oversight problem.
As an effect of limiting political rights in the workplace, the
“disempowered workforce was unable or reluctant to speak out on safety
issues for fear of management retribution.”73 Occidental managed to slip by
without a single manslaughter charge against management personnel or
prosecution for health and safety legislation breaches.74 Only the public
outcry surrounding the event brought judicial scrutiny in the form of a
judicial report on what went awry. The slow government response, based
solely on public reaction, is troubling. The government “essentially cease[s]
to play the role of a proactive policy-maker” if the “recognition of
regulatory failure with regard to safety or the environment is now
dependent on sustained public reaction to disasters.”75
Occidental apparently did not learn its lesson from this narrow run-in
with human rights violations, likely due to the absolute lack of criminal
repercussions. In 2003, U.S. Special Forces began collaborating with the
Colombian army in Northern Colombia as ‘advisors.’76 Their objective was
to “train the Colombian army to protect Occidental’s 500 mile pipeline
from leftist guerillas.”77 As recently as 2017, rebel group National
Liberation Army (ELN) forced Occidental to partially suspend operations.78
The ELN “opposes the presence of multinational companies in the mining
and oil sector, claiming that they seize natural resources without leaving
benefits to the country’s population or economy.”79
C. Deepwater Horizon
Similar to the Piper Alpha disaster, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of
2010 saw BP and its executives escape with little more than clean-up fees
and a tarnished reputation. Prosecutors dropped manslaughter charges
regarding the eleven deaths, and there was no effective criminal punishment

72. Id.
73. Id. at 117.
74. Id. at 119.
75. Id. at 124.
76. Id. at 123 (internal citations omitted).
77. Id.
78. Luis Jaime Acosta, Occidental starts to suspend Colombia production after rebel
attacks, REUTERS (March 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/colombia-oil/occidentalstarts-to-suspend-colombia-production-after-rebel-attacks-idUSL2N1GE1AE (last visited
Jan. 23, 2019).
79. Id.
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for the environmental devastation that wreaked havoc on the Gulf of
Mexico.80
D. United Kingdom
Common-law countries have also been liberal in allowing foreign suits to
be brought against domestic companies. In the United Kingdom, the courts
allowed a suit to be brought against a parent company for the actions of its
subsidiaries abroad. A uranium mine worker in Namibia, who developed
cancer of the larynx allegedly as a result of inhaling silica uranium at the
mine,81 was able to bring a suit in England against Rio Tinto PLC, over the
mine’s health hazards, despite the court acknowledging Namibia as the
proper venue.82 The court effectively recognized that the worker would be
unable to obtain legal assistance or relief if the case was not heard in
England.83 The Court determined that substantial justice could not be
carried out in Namibia, making England the more appropriate forum for
justice. Similarly, judges allowed a lawsuit against Thor Chemicals,
alleging mercury poisoning of its workers, to proceed in an English venue.84
Four workers died from exposure to mercury in the factory.85 Thor
Chemicals eventually settled out of court.86
E. Alien Tort Claims Act
The United States, along with the United Kingdom, is in a relatively
unique position due to the jurisdictional anomaly of the Alien Tort Claims
Act, enacted so that victims of piracy on the high seas could seek redress in
the United States. Foreigners have utilized this Act to bring claims against
U.S.-based corporations for human rights abuses committed abroad. For
example, Burmese residents were successful in bringing a suit in a U.S.
District Court against Unocal, a U.S.-based oil company, for allegations
that the company was complicit in aiding and abetting Burmese authorities

80. Oliver Milman, Manslaughter charges dropped against two BP employees in
Deepwater spill, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/dec/03/manslaughter-charges-dropped-bp-employees-deepwater-horizonoil-spill (last accessed Dec. 14, 2018).
81. Connelly v. RTZ Corporation PLC., [1997] APP.L.R. 07/24.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Jedrzej George Frinaz, Social and environmental litigation against transnational
firms in Africa, 42:3 J. OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES 363, 367(2004).
85. Id.
86. Id.
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in committing human rights violations.87 Other foreigners were also
successful in bringing suits against U.S. companies such as in Botowo v.
ChevronTexaco Corp., a cause of action against Chevron for its “role in
transporting Nigerian military troops on two separate occasions to locations
where non-violent protestors were subsequently killed and injured.”88
Similarly, a judge allowed a case brought by the son of a Nigerian activist
and outspoken critic of Shell in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company
and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC to move forward. Wiwa
accused Shell of facilitating the writer’s death.89 Shell quickly settled Wiwa,
the most promising of the two cases, shortly before the trial was set to
begin, escaping a potential doling of justice.90
Indonesia provides another case study regarding mining in conflict zones
and the potential for litigious response in the United States. Indonesia had a
weak, corrupt institution, which resulted in another clash between human
rights and natural resource extraction.91 U.S. miner Freeport-McMoRan
owned and operated one of the world’s largest copper and gold mines and
established a mining town in Indonesia to oversee the mine’s operations.92
While Freeport owned the mine “all surface and sub-surface resources
belonged to the [Indonesian] government.”93 Keeping with tradition,
tensions between the mining company and the local population began to
escalate. In 1996, the locals had initiated riots in Freeport’s mining town of
Tembagapura and the nearby town of Timika.94 In one such instance,
fighters shot at several company vehicles, killing one employee and
wounding several others.95 Following this incident, the mining company
asked the Indonesian government “to provide sufficient protection to allow
the mine to continue operating and for its employees to be able to live and
work without fear.”96 Eventually, security forces protecting the mining
87. Pegg, supra note 49, at 17.
88. Id. at 18. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 18.
90. Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/business/global/09shell.html?ref=global
(last accessed Dec. 14, 2018).
91. Simon Handelsman, Mining in conflict zones, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS 125, 125 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003) (E-book) (internal citations
omitted).
92. Id. at 126.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 129.
95. Id. at 127.
96. Id. at 128.
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operations eventually came into conflict with freedom fighters, which
brought allegations of human rights violations.97 Authorities attributed the
attack to the Free Papua Movement (OPM), with whom Freeport had
several incidences.98 In response to the attack:
In order to facilitate the capture of the OPM operatives the
government security forces took about 20 local people into
custody, some of whom have never been found and are
presumed dead; others, including women, were locked in
shipping boxes under inhumane conditions.99
In April 1996, two lawsuits were lodged in U.S. courts, “both alleging
human rights violations against the local people by the Indonesian security
forces supported by Freeport.”100 One lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District
Court in New Orleans and the other was filed in Louisiana state court, on
behalf of two indigenous Amungme persons.101 Despite Freeport’s direct
involvement in the human rights abuses, the suits alleged that “Freeport
supported Indonesian security forces in committing human rights abuses,
polluted traditional lands with mine tailings, and attempted ‘cultural
genocide’ on the local people.”102 Many of the locals believed that the
existence and operation of the Freeport mine was the catalyst for the human
rights abuses; without Freeport operating in the area, none of these abuses
would have occurred.103 These circumstances again probe the issue of
whether the relationship between the extractive company and the

97. Id. at 127.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 129.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 130. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La.
1997), the district court suit lodged on behalf of the Agmungme tribe. The court ultimately
found that, although the plaintiff Beanal had standing to bring his allegations, he only had
standing in regard to his own violations, not on behalf of the tribe. The court found that
Beanal failed to state a claim pursuant to either the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture Victim
Protection Act, the latter of which the Court determined did not apply to corporations. Nor
did the Plaintiff state a claim for an environmental tort in violation of the law of nations. See
also Alomang v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 811 So.2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2002), which
similarly alleged foreign environmental violations, international human rights violations, and
cultural geocide. The problems with this lawsuit stemmed primarily from pleading
deficiencies, not any jurisdictional defects or problems with the substantive law.
103. Id. at 129.
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government security forces is attenuated enough to indicate complicity on
behalf of the TNC.
F. BRICS countries
In the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South
Africa – there is very little precedent on this issue of corporate liability,
which alone should speak to the necessity for an international system that
has some form of TNC accountability. It is unlikely that the lack of cases
from these countries is due to an absence of violations. It is more
conceivable that violations do occur but go unreported, because of either
lack of an avenue in which to lodge a complaint or for fear of reprisals.
TNCs in the BRICS countries have several commonalities. The largest ones
are primarily state-owned, state-operated, or state-influenced, and most of
the notable companies have long histories of environmental disasters, such
as oil spills or pipeline explosions. Most of the major extractive industry
companies are majority state-owned, creating a double-insulation effect
against lawsuits and liability. State sovereignty acts as a shield, deterring
potential lawsuits. Cases that are able to gain traction are often buried with
money. This problem is exacerbated when abuses occur within a State’s
own borders.
Two major companies in India, Hindustan Zinc Ltd. and National
Mineral Development Corporation, both operate exclusively within India’s
territory.104 This method of operation makes it difficult for a country to
exercise its autonomy and eject a TNC from its borders for its
environmental, human rights abuses, as Gabon did with China’s Sinopec
Limited.105 Gabon was forced to suspend Sinopec’s operations due to
concerns regarding its environmentally damaging methods, particularly
regarding the company’s seismic activities and the corresponding
detrimental effects on local gorilla populations.106 Again, though, this TNC
104. Hindustan Zinc Limited, Annual Report 2017-2018, VEDANTA (April 8, 2018),
http://www.hzlindia.com/latest_news/annual-report-2017-18/ (last accessed Dec. 14, 2018);
NATIONAL MINERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Annual Report 2017-2018,
https://www.nmdc.co.in/docs/NMDC%20AR%202018%20Web%204-9-2018.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 14, 2018).
105. JOHANNA JANSSON, CHRISTOPHER BURKE, AND WENRAN JIANG, Chinese Companies
in the Extractive Industries of Gabon & the DRC: Perceptions of Transparency, CENTER FOR
CHINESE
STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY
OF
STELLENBOSCH,
17-18
(Jan.
2009),
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/Chinese_Companies_in_the_Extractive_Industri
es_of_Gabon_and_the_DRC._CCS_report_August_2009.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2019).
106. LUISIA I. RABANAL, ET. AL., Oil prospecting and its impact on large rainforest
mammals in Loango National Park, Gabon, 143 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1017, 2013
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suffered only a financial setback; no meaningful punishment or retribution
for the environmental damage suffered by the people of Gabon ever
occurred.107 Such is the pattern.
To call Russia a major player in the oil and gas industry would be an
understatement. The European continent is reliant on Russian-supplied oil
and gas. Two major corporations, Lukoil and Gazprom, have mammoth
reach around the globe. Lukoil is involved in numerous projects for the
exploration and development in countries across the globe. The company
carries out oil and natural gas operations, in Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Italy, the
Netherlands Ghana, Egypt, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Cameroon, Mexico, Nigeria,
Norway, Romania, and Uzbekistan.108 Lukoil sells oil and petroleum
products to most of Eastern Europe, and the TNC even conducts geological
exploration and production from its subsidiary in Houston, Texas.109 Even
with massive global operations, the majority of Lukoil’s operations and
exploration occur within Russia’s borders110. The company is also primarily
responsible for oil leaks from the Usinsk oil field, which total yearly to
twice the amount of oil emitted in the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill.111
The amount of damage wrought on the environment in northern Russia is
currently untold. As the primary licenser for the oil field, the Lukoil bears
the corresponding primary responsibility. However, due to poor oversight
and easily-paid fines, there is little incentive for the Russian oil giant to
mend its ways. Not one to play by the rules, Russia is unlikely to initiate
stricter enforcement for its massively profitable oil and natural gas industry,
which has average returns “twice as high as in other countries . . . thanks to
huge government tax breaks and subsidies.”112 And with Russia’s recent
snub to the ECtHR, strong international oversight and criminal
responsibility for corporations seems like the most viable option.113 Rather
(Feb. 18, 2010), https://www.eva.mpg.de/documents/Elsevier/Rabanal_Oil_BiologCons_
2010_1552612.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
107. Id.
108. LUKOIL, Geographic reach, LUKOIL OIL COMPANY, http://www.lukoil.com/
Company/BusinessOperation/GeographicReach (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Alec Luhn, The town that reveals how Russia spills two Deepwater Horizons of oil
each year, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2016/aug/05/the-town-that-reveals-how-russia-spills-two-deepwater-horizons-of-oil-eachyear (last visited Jan. 25, 2019).
112. Id.
113. Russia passes law to overrule European human rights court, BBC NEWS (Dec. 4,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35007059 (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
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than targeting the contentious country itself, the international community
could seek redress through its state-owned interests.
Hindustan Zinc Ltd., referenced earlier, is the second-largest producer of
zinc in the world. The corporation was also named to RobecoSAM’s
Corporate Sustainability Assessment Yearbook in 2018.114 RobecoSAM
nominates the most sustainable companies in each major industry. The
Yearbook mention makes Hindustan Zinc effectively an ‘honorable
mention.’115 This accolade came less than two years after a complaint was
lodged before the National Green Tribunal against the corporation. The
plaintiffs alleged that “as a result of the mining activity and non-compliance
of preventative measures,” the community has suffered a myriad of
environmental problems, including reduced and polluted drinking water.116
The complaint attributed 111 deaths as a result of Hindustan’s operations.117
The judgment by the Tribunal indicated the contrary, though the judgment
was lukewarm and relatively indefinite.118 At present, India is party to
several United Nations human rights treaties but is not a party to either of
the Optional Protocols to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights which allows individual citizens to lodge a complaint against India
for alleged human rights violations.119 Unless India becomes a party to the
Optional Protocols, there is no individual avenue of redress against the
state, nevertheless state-owned corporations.
The presence of Sinopec Limited, has caused aggravated tensions
between Somalia and Ethiopia due to its oil exploration into the African
continent. The Ogaden National Liberation Front, an ethnic Somali group,

114. Hindustan Zinc Limited, supra, note 104.
115. RobecoSAM, “Companies,” https://yearbook.robecosam.com/companies/ (last
visited Mar. 24, 2019).
116. Nath v. Hindustan Zinc, Ltd., No. 128/2014 National Green Tribunal (CZ),
Judgment,
3
(May
12,
2016)
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/
Hindustan%20Zinc%20Bhilwara%20NGT%20order.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). See
also Davan v. Hindustan Zinc, Ltd., No. 129/2014 National Green Tribunal (CZ), Judgment,
3 (May 12, 2016) (decided in conjunction with Nath).
117. Id. at 4.
118. Id. at 15-16.
119. Ratification Status for India, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?
CountryID=79&Lang=EN.
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killed 74 workers at a Sinopec oilfield in 2007.120 The oilfield is in part of
Ethiopia that is comprised primarily of ethnic Somalis. The rebel group
claimed they carried out the attack to discourage the oil industry’s
operations, which financially benefit the Ethiopian government. The
majority of the workers killed were Ethiopian. The company has also been
named as a chronic river polluter by a watchdog group in China as a result
of its role in polluting some of China’s major rivers.121 The State
Environmental Protection Administration gave what was effectively a slap
on the wrist in response.122
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has an even more
woeful environmental record. CNPC has been responsible for several
devastating environmental and human rights disasters in the last fifteen
years. In 2003, at least 191 people were killed as the result of an explosion
in a natural gas field under the control of CNPC.123 It is likely that the
accident was a result of “poor safety procedures or faulty rescue
operations,” indicated by the “high death toll and the long lag in reporting
accurate information” regarding the accident.124 In 2005, an explosion in
Jilin resulted in a “50-mile slick of toxic benzene” that reached the Songhua
River.125 In 2010, damaged pipeline owned by CNPC resulted in a large oil
spill in the Xiangang Port that threatened to pollute the Yellow River.126
Chinese authorities were unsurprisingly vague when referencing the extent
and cause of the damage, as well as the delayed response.127
CNPC’s behavior in Chad was so deplorable that the Chad government
suspended CNPC’s operations after an oil spill in “several sites near a
120. Anita Powell, Ethnic Somali rebels kill 74 at Chinese oilfield in Ethiopia, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/25/ethiopia (last
visited Mar. 24, 2019).
121. Sinopec punished for water pollution, REUTERS (July 4, 2007),
https://uk.reuters.com/article/china-environment-sinopec/sinopec-punished-for-waterpollution-idUKHKG702120070704 (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).
122. Id.
123. Joseph Kahn, Gas Well Explosion and Fumes Kill 191 in China, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
26, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/26/world/gas-well-explosion-and-fumes-kill191-in-china.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
124. Id.
125. David Lague, China blames Oil Company for Benzene Spill in River, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 25, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/25/world/asia/china-blames-oilcompany-for-benzene-spill-in-river.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=A2910CB69B895
86CC64DF90E9CFBD9FE&gwt=pay (last visited Jan. 26 2019).
126. David Barboza, Large Oil Spill Reported in China, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/asia/04china.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
127. Id.
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forest.”128 The oil minister of Chad detailed how CNPC “dug huge trenches
and let oil flow into them, and then had it removed by local workers
without protective gear.”129 The Chad government threatened to hold the
company’s managers responsible for unspecified criminal violations.130
This laundry list of environmental disasters which have all had
detrimental impact to the environment and human rights in China are
symptomatic of a larger problem for the country, namely the lack of any
accountability. China is identical to India in its lack of an individualcomplaints procedure for victims of human rights violations at the hands of
the government or its TNCs.131 The ability of the Chinese government to be
so well-insulated against any repercussions for the atrocious environmental
record of its corporations bespeaks of the larger need for change in the
defunct system.
The operations of two of Brazil’s largest TNCs offer a dichotomous view
that reflects the behavior of TNCs in BRICS countries in general. In 2011,
Vale (S.A.), a multinational corporation involved in mining iron ore, nickel,
and other minerals, announced it would invest “an estimated $2 billion in
the world’s most controversial hydroelectric dam project.”132 Critics of the
Belo Monte dam in the Brazilian Amazon have alleged that Brazil’s
government was dismissive of native tribes and locals regarding the
environmental impact the dam would have on the surrounding areas.133
In contrast, Petrobras, a corporation majority-owned by the Brazilian
government with a global reach, was responsible for a stream of major oil
spills from the mid-70s until 2001, when the company undertook a major
corporate social overhaul. Since then, Petrobras has become a member of
the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Brazil, conducts emergency
drills to respond to spills,134 and adopted a Zero Spill plan to minimize oil
128. Chad suspends China firm CNPC over oil spill, BBC NEWS (Aug. 14, 2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-23697269
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Ratification status for China, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (last
visited Jan. 27, 2019).
132. Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil’s Vale Joins “Avatar” Battle as Belo Monte Dam Investor,
FORBES (April 28, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/04/28/brazils-valejoins-avatar-battle-as-belo-monte-dam-investor/#23ba78051379 (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).
133. Id.
134. Brazil, INTERNATIONAL TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FEDERATION LIMITED (2018),
https://www.itopf.org/knowledge-resources/countries-territories-regions/countries/brazil/
(last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
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spill risk.135 The company has also doubled down on other commitments to
environmental safety, undertaking an active and successful conservation
effort to rebuild the humpback whale population in Brazilian waters.
Petrobras also funds the Tamar Project, which protects sea turtle habitats in
Brazil. This level of corporate social responsibility does not just
materialize. The public image overhaul landed Petrobras on the Dow Jones
Sustainable Index from 2006-2015 due to its environmental philanthropy.
Setting Brazil apart from the other BRICS countries is Brazil’s relatively
clean record regarding oil and gas, and extractive resource companies’
operations. While the hydroelectric dam in the Amazon is sure to raise
human rights issues in the future, there is little to be found to implicate a
checkered history of violating human rights by oil companies in similar
ways as Russia and China. Setting Brazil further apart is the fact that Brazil
has accepted the Additional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights which allows for individual complaints to potentially
be heard by the Human Rights Council.136 In the future, should human
rights or indigenous groups have complaints against Brazil for its
operations, there is a direct avenue of redress against the country, though
still not the corporations themselves.
South Africa, the last of the BRICS countries, is home to one of the
largest gold producers in the world – AngloGold Ashanti. The company
began gold mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after
establishing a relationship with the Nationalist and Integrationist Front
(FNI), “an armed group responsible for serious human rights abuses
including war crimes and crimes against humanity.”137 AngloGold’s
partnership with FNI provided AngloGold with “security for its operations
and staff” while AngloGold provided “logistical and financial support” to
FNI.138 When FNI asked for money, they got it.139 HRW claims the
company “knew, or should have known, that the FNI armed group had
committed grave human rights abuses against civilians and was not a party
to the transitional government” in the DRC. This direct involvement with a
135. Operating Safety, PETROBRAS (2019) http://www.petrobras.com.br/en/society-andenvironment/environment/operating-safety/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019).
136. Ratification Status for Brazil, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx (last
visited Jan. 27, 2019).
137. The Curse of Gold: Democratic Republic of Congo, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 10
(2005).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2.
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group committing human rights abuses in the extreme is the most heinous
example from the five countries. South Africa is party to the Additional
Protocol allowing for acceptance of individual complaints under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which would provide
avenues of redress for some of the victims of FNI’s conduct.140
Beyond countries with relatively accessible records, there also lies the
problem where an information vacuum impacts the ability to act. In
countries such as Angola, Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia,
Ecuador, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Peru, Venezuela, “collaboration
between repressive regimes and oil multinationals has been documented
only incompletely.”141 Thus the need for human rights aid and a more direct
avenue to justice against these multinationals is not fully realized.
The current system allows for deflection by secondarily-responsible
countries, or financial penalties are taken after the fact, doing little to deter
infringements in the first place. There must be accountability, which the
current system is failing to provide, for the actions of international
companies which devastate both the environment and basic human rights.
Companies are complacent and neglect environmental human rights until
the public’s outcry is too loud to ignore or until tragedy has struck. In either
instance, governments are failing in their duties. Governments are either
incapable of policing TNC behavior, due to poor political infrastructure or a
lack of resources, or because of the government’s complicity in the
corporation’s operations. Money acts as an escape hatch from the rare
opportunities for true legal reprisals. A separate and independent regime is
needed for meaningful accountability.
IV. How to hold TNCs internationally accountable for their actions?
Transnational corporations should be interested in preventing human
rights violations, even beyond potential international pressure. TNCs
humanitarianism should logically stem, first and foremost, from the
benevolent desire to do good. Nongovernmental organizations have
recognized the role that TNCs could play in improving human rights
conditions surrounding their businesses.142 Unfortunately, such public140. Ratification Status for South Africa, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx
(last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
141. Woolfson, supra note 54, at 122.
142. Frans-Paul van der Putten, Gemma Crijns, and Harry Hummels, The ability of
corporations to protect human rights in developing countries, in BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: DILEMMAS AND SOLUTIONS, 82, 83 (Rory Sullivan ed., 2003).
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mindedness often conflicts with the usual profit agenda. There are certain
countries in which corporations cannot possibly invest without directly
contributing to serious human rights violations, and again, absent a
“mandate to be autonomous actors in international relations,” TNCs lack
incentive to comply where corporate profits deviate from preserving human
and environmental rights.143
The justification that “rich and developing countries do not make the
same demands in respect of human rights,” and therefore TNCs can
somehow rationalize operating at some lower standard wholly misses the
crux of human rights law.144 All persons are entitled to a basic level of
treatment that bears no justification for deviation. The existence of an
international system with the ability “to enforce a legal obligation on
[TNCs] to take human rights related action… would be in the interest of the
controlling shareholders for the company to comply with these legal
rules.”145 Absent such a supervisory system, however, controlling
stakeholders are not under pressure to comply with a regime that has no
direct effect on their operations. It is only when the overall corporate
interest becomes dependent upon human rights promotion, that the
company’s nature will shift to emphasize compliance.146 At current, it is
mostly reputational damage with consumers – social pressures – that result
in lost business that shapes corporate thinking.147 Thus TNCs need to be
accountable to a higher power with the authority to mete punishment and
administer justice.
It is optimistic, and perhaps juvenile, to expect that all TNCs would be
focal points of any scheme imposing liability for abuses. Those TNCs that
have the potential to be subjects of international liability for human rights
violations and environmental wrongs should conform to a particular set of
characteristics. First, the company “originated in a developed country,
where its head office is still located…[and] controls assets or operations in
143. Id.
144. Id at 84.
145. Id. at 87.
146. Id. at 86.
147. For example, Nike has faced intense backlash for its child labor practices abroad,
which has forced the company to overhaul its manufacturing procedures. See JOHN. H
CUSHMAN JR., International Business; Nike Pledges to End Child Labor and Apply U.S.
Rules Abroad, N. Y. TIMES, May 13, 1998 https://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/13/business/
international-business-nike-pledges-to-end-child-labor-and-apply-us-rules-abroad.html (last
visited Jan. 23, 2019). Despite an overhaul in the early aughts, Nike remains synonymous
with child labor violations.
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a developing country where human rights abuses take place.”148 The
accumulation of the TNC’s operations makes it one of the largest market
participants in at least one of its operating fields, including, but not limited
to resource extraction of manufacturing.149 Potential TNCs include not just
the “‘usual suspects’ in human rights literature such as oil and mining
firms, but the whole range of manufacturing, extractive and services
companies.”150
The assumption that human rights initiatives by TNCs would be warmly
welcomed by the local population is also problematic.151 Particularly in
countries with histories of colonialism and imperialism, local populations
might be reluctant to embrace foreign human rights intervention.152 This
problem is exacerbated by the fact that the originators of human rights
protection and intervention are the former colonizers and imperialists
themselves, which understandably causes skepticism amongst formerly
dominated areas.153When the entities exerting human rights influences are
those that previously participated in violations, such efforts would be
considerably undermined. At the very worst, “should they emerge as tools
of foreign political influence . . . certain human rights activities might easily
be interpreted as mere excuses for political domination.”154 Local
populations, can be relatively accepting of foreign influence “as long as
they believe that it is beneficial,” and would accept engagement in “subtle
forms of human rights promotion” from corporations with whom the
communities have longstanding relationships.155 These are rare and
precarious circumstances, and, thus far, allowing corporations to self-police
for human rights violations has proven ineffective. It is farcical for the
international community to continue to rely on self-governance and public
criticisms to curb this disturbing trend. Instead of reliance on TNCs
themselves for accountability, other avenues must be explored.
When evaluating TNC liability, it is necessary to first examine the extent
of TNC’s involvement with environmental human rights abuses to
determine what level of responsibility is borne by the corporation. There are
four major factors to consider regarding a transnational corporation’s
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Putten, supra note 142, at 84.
Id. at 85
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 90.
Id.
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involvement in potential human rights abuses. First is the matter of degree –
whether the violations are sporadic and isolated, or planned, systematic, and
continuous.156 While isolated incidents are still inexcusable, they differ
strongly from the pattern of a repressive government. Repetitive conduct is
less likely to be the product of a one-off accident or lapse in judgement;
systematic violations indicate awareness and perhaps complicity.
Second is the nature of the violations – are they the direct result of
government activities or is the government merely impotent when securing
human rights?157 If a government is merely too weak to effectively protect
and ensure certain rights, those violations seem to be of a lesser degree than
when a government is actively seeking to deprive its residents of their
rights. Some governments are ineffective to the point that they cannot
respond to human rights violations, regardless of their desire to do so. This
situation differs from when a government is either participating in the
human rights abuses or is actively turning a blind eye in order to reap the
benefits of a TNC’s operations. China, for example, is more than capable of
responding to the environmental degradation resulting from CNPC’s
operations but is choosing instead to allay concerns to the best of its ability.
Third, is the breach regarding fundamental or lesser rights?158 There is
theoretically no hierarchy within the rights protected in the area of human
rights law. The fact remains, however, that some rights are ‘non-derogable’
during national emergencies, which contradicts that principle. Therefore it
is important to consider if the corporation violated a right that is nonderogable or one that is similarly essential such that a violation speaks of
egregious conduct.
Lastly, what is the proximity of the corporation to the violations?159 Is
the connection direct, as through a company’s operations or products, or
indirect, as through financial infusions into an abusive governing regime? 160
A corporation’s role in creating or worsening violations against local
populations can be demonstrated either through a corporations catalytic
effect in bringing about conflict with military forces or directly through
physical abuses by the corporation or through utilizing military
assistance.161 The level of a corporation’s involvement and complicity with
human rights violations is critical in assessing their liability. For example,
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Pegg, supra note 49, at 11-12 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12-13.
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Shell’s actions in Nigeria were indirect but highly aggravated the situation.
It is possible that without the presence of Shell and its requests for
assistance and security that certain violations would not have occurred,
differing from a situation where the TNC is mostly liable through its
financial infusions which indirectly fund a corrupt, oppressive regime.
Two distinct pathways emerge when considering how to hold TNCs
accountable for their environmental human rights violations: through
economic sanctions or by pursuing criminal liability, with preferability for
the latter. While taking economic measures might seem enticing, there are a
multitude of drawbacks that make this method ultimately undesirable.
Trade sanctions grapple with political obstacles and the unintended
consequence of intensifying the behavior the economic punishment seeks to
discourage. Both pathways, trade sanctions and criminal liability, are
typically aimed at impacting states. It would be effectively inconceivable
for an international trade organization to individually target a TNC, but it is
not so far-fetched to consider expanding international criminal jurisdiction
for environmental human rights violations to cover corporate liability.
Given that the ICC can already hold individuals responsible for specific
international crimes, the concept of expanding the Court’s jurisdiction to
encompass TNCs and their environmental human rights crimes is not a farfetched concept. Nor is it unrealistic in the modern climate for countries to
support modifications to their human rights treaties to hold TNCs
accountable, rather than be the scapegoat themselves.
A. Trade Sanctions
It is in the interest of trade organizations to pursue long-term human
rights goals, which are preconditions for successful trade. Human rights not
only make individuals better democratic citizens but also better economic
actors.162 The UN General Assembly in 1999 emphasized the need to
analyze the consequences of globalization for human rights:
[While] increased trade and investment has brought significant
benefits to many nations and people…trade liberalization can
lead to widening disparities between and within nations, increase
people’s vulnerability to external economic variations and

162. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, World Trade Forum , Human Rights, Markets and
Economic Welfare: Constitutional Functions of the Emerging UN Human Rights
Constitution, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29, 32-33) (Frederick M.
Abbott et al. ed., vol. 5, 2009) (ebook).
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shocks and as a result put at risk the realization of fundamental
human rights.163
International organizations must look to human rights standards as the
foundational basis from which they create their policies.164 While the World
Trade Organization Agreements currently have limited exceptions in their
frameworks to allow for deviations from Member obligations, there is room
to expand the organization’s emphasis on human rights. Article XX of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows unilateral actions
by WTO Members to make exceptions to protect health and conservation.
Specifically, Members can take trade-restrictive measures on products that
are “necessary to protect public morals,” “necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health,” or “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources.”165 The Panel in US Gambling interpreted the
term public morals to mean as the “standards of right and wrong conduct
maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation,” and public order as
“the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in
public policy and law.”166 While this interpretation arguably allows for
countries to make allowances to protect environmental, human rights, it
also requires individual nations to act responsibly. This kind of
individualized response does not have the magnitude of impact necessary to
deter, resolve, or amend human rights violations, unless the countries are
major trading partners. In that case, though, the sanctioning country would
also suffer economic consequences for wishing to discipline the other’s
human rights abuses – not a realistic avenue.
The European Union has long acknowledged the institutional linkage
between market access and human rights, as this concept was established as
a condition of accession to the Union.167 The European Communities have
also established “links between trade and human rights in domestic trade

163. Stephanie Grant, Functional Distinction or Bilingualism? Human Rights and Trade:
The UN Human Rights System, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 133, 136
(Frederick M. Abbott et al. ed., vol. 5, 2009) (ebook) (internal citations omitted).
164. Id. at 139.
165. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 art. XX [hereinafter GATT].
166. Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling And Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted 20 April 2005), as
modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS285/AB/R, DSR 2005:XII.
167. Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1 (see
particularly TITLE XVII, Article 130u(2)).
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regulations in the context of granting preferential treatment.”168 Currently,
the World Trade Organization and its agreements do not establish
comparable explicit linkages between human rights and trade, but the WTO
has the power to modify its standards to emphasize compliance with
environmental, human rights.169 However, the “question arises whether, on
this basis, institutional links between trade regulation, the rule of law and
human rights should be institutionally and legally expanded within the
multilateral trading system of the WTO.”170
Product-based trade measures in the form of import restrictions appear to
be an easy way to target products linked to human rights abuses. These
restrictions could be in the form of ‘inward measures,’ to prevent harms the
product could cause the restricting State’s population, such as asbestos
products known to cause cancer.171 ‘Outward measures’ target human rights
abuses linked to specific products from an exporting State.172 For example,
products manufactured in conflict conditions and are associated with gross
human rights violations might be the measure’s targets. Another
problematic aspect of economic sanctions is that they “treat human beings
as pawns in a geopolitical game, contrary to the bottom line of human rights
which treats human beings and ends rather than means.”173 The drawbacks
to the imposition of economic sanctions on a country as a result of the
actions of a TNC for whom the state has liability are far-reaching.
The largest trade giants, such as the US and the EU, would be able to
impose the strongest unilateral sanctions.174 This impact is the strongest
when there has been a large pre-existing trade partnership with the
sanctioned country.175 Additionally, once one country has made the first
move to condemn another country’s actions through trade sanctions, other
countries are more likely to follow, increasing the sanction’s
effectiveness.176

168. THOMAS COTTIER, Governance, Trade, and Human Rights in INTERNATIONAL TRADE
95 (Frederick M. Abbott et al. ed., vol. 5, 2009) (ebook).
169. Id.
170. Id. (emphasis added).
171. SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 127, 268
(2011) (ebook).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 94 (internal citations omitted).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 93,
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U.N. Security Council trade sanctions are incredibly harsh, as “they
deprive the target State of alternative trading partners.”177 The entirety of
the U.N. is weighted behind these sanctions, giving them incredible weight.
It is because of this severity that the Security Council rarely resorts to such
measures. It is worth noting that Security Council sanctions
[A]re normally limited rather than comprehensive. Furthermore,
comprehensive trade sanctions can have the effect of provoking
nationalistic backlashes and entrenching regimes, rather than
their presumed desired effect of prompting a disgruntled
population to force a regime to change its ways.178
When a government decides it would rather double down than cave to the
international community’s pressure, the citizens are the ones who suffer the
consequences. Food shortages, for example, could be prolonged, and in an
effort to maintain control, governments might further restrict rights.
Countries should consider expanding criminal responsibility rather
exposing vulnerable populations to a higher risk of violations in a
misguided attempt to sanction the responsible entities.
B. Criminal Responsibility
Although trade sanctions are theoretically feasible, the potential to
exacerbate on-going human rights violations disqualifies this route as a
viable option. Expanding criminal responsibility is possible on either the
international level through the International Criminal Court (ICC) or
regional levels through various human rights treaties. These options are
preferable to the more politically-minded UN International Court of Justice,
which also only hears state-brought suits.179 Modifying the ICC’s
jurisdiction to incorporate liability for corporations as well as expanding the
subject-matter jurisdiction to cover environmental human rights violations
is the best, slightly idealistic, option. The alternative is incentivizing
countries to agree to enlarge their regional human rights treaties to include
corporate responsibility for human rights violations, as Africa is already
keen to do.
The concept of corporate criminal liability is not a foreign concept.
Virtually all developed countries have some form of criminal liability for
corporations, at the very least for the prohibition of bribes. The ability to
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34.
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hold a corporation and its respective employees liable for their cohesive
illegal actions easily translates into the realm of international criminal law.
At present, under the Rome Statute governing the ICC, only natural persons
can be prosecuted.180
Other international actors are flirting with the idea of including legal
persons in the list of potential targets. Special Court for Lebanon, an
international tribunal, has already charged corporate persons with the
“willful interference with the administration of justice when disclosing
confidential information regarding protected witnesses among other
things.”181 International Humanitarian Law recognizes and binds non-state
actors to maintaining peace and respecting the rules of war.182 Should the
African Union’s Malabo Protocol come into operation, it would expand the
jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human and People’s Rights
to corporations liable for serious crimes in Africa.183 The Special Court of
Sierra Leone examined the trafficking of ‘blood diamonds’ in exchange for
arms Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, the first instance of an African leader
facing an international tribunal.184 From there “it is not a far stretch to
imagine a future case in which a business director could stand trial for
trafficking conflict materials for arms or charges of enslavement in the
mining of the materials under a theory of indirect co-perpetration.”185

180. Rome Statute, art. 25(1).
181. David Martini, Corporate Criminal Responsibility at the ICC, ACADEMIC
FORESIGHTS,
http://www.academic-foresights.com/Corporate_Criminal_Responsibility_
at_the_ICC.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2018). Stating that the Special Court for Lebanon
recently charged…corporate persons (New TV S.A.L and Akhbar Beirut S.A.L.) with the
willful interference with the administration of justice when disclosing confidential
information regarding protected witnesses among other things.”
182. CHRISTIANE BOURLOYANNIS, The Security Council of the United Nations and the
Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 335, 337
(1992). See also, Martini, supra note 181, stating that the inclusion of non-state actors as
subjects of International Humanitarian Law is evident in the London Charter (also known as
the Nuremberg Charter, or, formally, Charter of the International Military Tribunal – Annex
to the Agreement for the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the
European Axis).
183. Joanna Kyriakakis, Corporations before International Criminal Courts:
Implications for the International Criminal Justice Project, 30 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 221, 222 (2017).
184. Prosecutor v. Taylor, SCSL-03-01-A-1389, Special Court for Sierra Leone (Sept.
26, 2013) http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Decisions/Taylor/Appeal/1389/SCSL-03-01-A1389.pdf.
185. Martini, supra note 181.
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It rather seems a matter of time before the Rome Statute is up for
modification to expand the relevant personhood requirement to include
corporate entities. Such an expansion would be a major step to closing the
holes in addressing international corporate liability. There would finally be
an international body to whom TNCs are directly accountable. The
European Court of Human Rights, which has been dodging the debate on
human rights and business, could also see a modification to its Convention,
officially incorporating corporate criminal liability into the Court’s agenda.
ICC Jurisdiction can either be exercised because a person is a national of a
party to the Rome Statute or because the alleged conduct took place within
the territory of a state party.186 Therefore, the nationality of the relevant
perpetrators within a company would play a key role; typically, this
designation would turn on the nationality of the CEO or director. One
scholar has a theory that would resolve the potential problem that would
arise should the head of a company not be a national to a state party of the
Rome Statute that was never physically present in the territory of a state
party.
This concern can be addressed by utilizing a theory of a coperpetration liability, one who plans, instigates, or orders another
can be held liable, even if that act was not within the territorial
confines of a state party so long as the action took place within
the territory.187
This method clears the important jurisdictional hurdle posed by the 42 nonsignatory, non-party states.
Another concern regarding the operation of TNCs that violate human
rights abuses are the auxiliary crimes that facilitate the carrying out of
violations. Such crimes include “illegal exploitation of resources, land
grabbing, corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, or the illegal
trafficking in arms, human beings, minerals, and drugs.”188 The Rome
Statute needs to be able to account for these secondary crimes’ contribution
to the more egregious violations, as they are integral parts to holding TNCs,
particularly in the extractive industries, responsible.
Parties to the Rome Statute would need to expand the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ICC. At present, only crimes against humanity, war
crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression are covered in the ICC’s
186. Rome Statute, art. 12.
187. Martini, supra note 181.
188. Id.
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catalogue of crimes.189 It is possible that particularly egregious acts of a
company, committed either directly or indirectly with the company’s
support, fit the requirements for crimes against humanity.190 However, for
the ICC a to have a full scope of power to properly hold TNCs accountable
for environmental human rights abuses, “ecocide” should be added to the
list of substantive crimes.. Defined as a “crime of wanton destruction of the
environment[,] [ecocide] fits within Article 5’s definition as ‘the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.’” This
characterization leaves a wide-enough berth to respect the jurisdiction of
the regional human rights courts, while finally allocating the power to
punish corporations for their environmental devastation and the resulting
infringements on human rights. Environmental destruction has the capacity
to diminish the human rights of entire populations. The safeguarding of the
environment is an essential task in ensuring that individuals can fully enjoy
their rights, but no international court yet has the explicit power to hold
persons responsible for environmental degradation and the resulting effects
on communities. Incorporating environmental protection and individual
liability in tandem would force TNCs to adopt better business practices that
benefit the environment and local populations
V. Conclusion
The search for an international system to hold TNCs liable for the
various environmental and human rights abuses that have become almost
synonymous with those in the extractive industries begins with examining
the successful avenues of redress for victims. The European Court of
Human Rights has been successful in using Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights to hold countries responsible for the
environmental wrongs originating within its jurisdiction. While the ECtHR
is limited in holding corporations directly responsible, the solidification of
state responsibility for TNC activity helps highlight the legal safe place in
which corporations are untouchable.
When trying to reconcile the international legal system with corporate
accountability, two potential pathways emerge. Relying on the “No Harm”
principle of state responsibility, the WTO, its Member States, and the
United Nations could use unilateral, regional, and international trade
sanctions to hold nations responsible for the actions of private corporations
for whom States are vicariously responsible. This tactic, however, is
189. Rome Statute, art. 5.
190. Id. art. 7.
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dangerous. Adding economic pressure to an already instable and oppressive
situation would more than likely lead to intensified human rights violations
by aggravating critical conditions for an already-vulnerable population.
This approach could pressure reluctant states toward the alternative option,
and away from unsavory economic sanctions.
The second route involves expanding the criminal jurisdiction of the ICC
to allow States or individuals to bring suit against TNCs for their
destructive operations and complicity in human rights violations. As the
only international court of its kind, allowing international prosecution for
individual’s crimes, the International Criminal Court is the perfect venue
and ripe for an overhaul to follow suit with more recent criminal tribunals.
The Rome Statute would also benefit from an expansion of its subject
matter jurisdiction for an effective, comprehensive approach to TNC
liability. Expanding the crimes for which individuals and corporations
could be prosecuted to include environmental crimes directly, rather than
relying on human rights violations as a proxy, the ICC could pioneer a new
international focus on environmental wrongs and the human rights
violations that accompany them. Rather than solely focusing on the
involvement of States and oppressive regimes, this method seeks to sew up
the gaping holes in international law which let TNCs often continue their
cyclical pattern of harmful behavior.
This paper serves to identify potential methods that the international
community could use to police the oft-egregious behavior of TNCs. Its
purpose is to gently nudge the actors of the extractive industries into
compliance with human rights violations, noting that the international
community is slowly warming up to the idea of crossing the traditional
norms of international responsibility to check the relatively unfettered
corporate world. While such a radical overhaul is not likely to happen in the
next several decades, common-law countries in particular are showing a
surprisingly brazen acceptance of foreign corporate liability, which should,
at the very least, nudge oil and gas corporations operating internationally to
reexamine their operations.
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